2 Kings 3:4-5 - Homiletics

Rebellion not to be entered upon with a light heart.

We are not sufficiently acquainted with the position of Moab under Israel, or with the extent of the Moabite resources, or with the grounds of just complaint which they may have had, to determine whether this particular rebellion was justifiable or no. But we can clearly see from the narrative that rebellion is a very grave matter, one to be very carefully considered, and only to be adventured upon under a combination of circumstances that very rarely occurs.

I. THERE MUST BE GREAT AND SERIOUS GRIEVANCES . Whether the tribute exacted by Israel from Moab was excessive and unduly burdensome, or even absolutely intolerable, depends on the actual wealth of the country in flocks and herds, which is a point whereon we have no sufficient information. But it is clear that a tribute may be excessive; nay, may be so oppressive as to justify revolt. There is a point beyond which a country's resources cannot be strained, and no subject people is bound to wait until the last straw has broken its back. Systematic insult and injury, determined misgovernment without prospect of alleviation, severe oppression, absolutely exhaustive taxation, are grievances against which a subject people may fairly rebel, and appeal to the arbitrament of arms. But the weight of the grievances endured is not the only factor in the equation.

II. THERE MUST ALSO BE A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS . Probably ten rebellions have been crushed for one that has succeeded. It is difficult to calculate chances beforehand; and hope is apt to "tell a flattering tale." To have a good cause is certainly not enough, fortune being too often on the side, not of justice and right, but of "big battalions." No cause could be much better than that of the gladiators who revolted under Spartacus; but Rome crushed them, and quenched the flames of their rebellion in blood, within the specs of two years from the time of its breaking out. The war of the Fronds was equally justifiable from a moral point of view; but it was hopeless from the first, and ought never to have been adventured on. On the other hand, the rebellion of the Jews against Antiochus Epiphanes, and that of the Swiss against Gessler, which might well have seemed hopeless to those who initiated them, succeeded. The issue in every case is in the hand of God, with whom, as Judas Maccabaeus said, "it is all one to deliver with a great multitude or a small company; for the victory of battle standeth not in the multitude of an host, but strength cometh from heaven" (1 Macc. 3:18, 19). Still, in every case, probabilities ought to be seriously weighed, consequences thoughtfully considered. In nine cases out of ten, it is better to "bear the ills we have than fly to others that we know not of." War is such a terrible evil, the source of such incalculable mischief and wretchedness, that almost everything should be borne before the appeal is made to it.

III. THERE SHOULD BE A REASONABLE CONVICTION THAT THE ADVANTAGES OF SUCCESS WILL OUTWEIGH THE EVILS OF THE STRUGGLE NECESSARY FOR ACHIEVING IT . An oppressed nationality will, perhaps, always expect this to be the case, and will turn a deaf ear to those who urge the prudential consideration. But it may be worth attending to nevertheless. It will be too late, if the discovery be made after the struggle is over, that "le jeu ne valait pus la chandelle." A nation may, after long years of bitter conflict, shake off a foreign yoke, but may emerge from the strife so weakened, so exhausted, so impoverished, that its new life is not worth living. The evils of the struggle are certain; the benefits of independence are problematical. Subject nationalities should consider well, before they break into revolt, not only the chances of success, but the probable balance of loss and gain supposing that ultimately success is achieved.