The ancient problem of fatalism, more particularly theological fatalism, has resurfaced with surprising vigour in the second half of the twentieth century. Two questions predominate in the debate: (1) Is divine foreknowledge compatible with human freedom and (2) How can God foreknow future free acts? Having surveyed the historical background of this debate in "The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge" and "Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez" (Brill: 1988), William Lane Craig now attempts to address these issues critically. His wide-ranging discussion brings together a thought- provoking array of related topics such as logical fatalism, multivalent logic, backward causation, precognition, time travel, counterfactual logic, temporal necessity, Newcomb's Problem, middle knowledge, and relativity theory. The present work serves both as a useful survey of the extensive literature on theological fatalism and related fields and as a stimulating assessment of the possibility of divine foreknowledge of future free acts.
William Lane Craig is an is an American Evangelical Christian apologist, theologian, and philosopher known for his contributions to the philosophy of religion, historical Jesus studies, and the philosophy of time. He is one of the most visible contemporary proponents of natural theology, often participating in debates on the existence of God. In 1979, Craig authored The Kalam Cosmological Argument, which is today the most published-on contemporary argument for theism in philosophy.
He is currently a Research Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology, Biola University. He is a fellow of the Discovery Institute's Center for Science and Culture, which is the hub of the intelligent design movement,[3] and a fellow of the International Society for Complexity, Information and Design (ISCID).[4] He is also a member of the American Philosophical Association, the American Academy of Religion, and a member and past president of both the Philosophy of Time Society and the Evangelical Philosophical Society.
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